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STABILIZATION POLICY IN NIGERIA UNDER
ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES:
A Postulated Empirical Macro-Model Approach

by
Busari T. Dipo and Olayiwola W. Kolawole*

The study examines the effectiveness ofstabilisation policy in Nigeria under
alternative exchange rate regimes. A simple version ofthe Mundell - Fleming model
was adopted. The results indicate that the exchange rate regime has implications
for the outcome of any stabilisation measure adopted, and further, it is observed
that the success of debt management strategies will depend on the exchange rate
regime. The study argued that the impact offiscal policy on the current account
balance also depends on the exchange rate regime. We arrived at these conclusions
based on certain assumptions such as static expectation and by ignoring price
movement. In sum, the study supports the use of a flexible exchange rate regime by
an indebted but reforming economy like Nigeria.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one ofthe greatest development challenges that has confronted Nigeria
in the last decade has been the design and implementation of appropriate policy
rules for achieving domestic and external equilibria. At the home front, the nation is
faced with the problem of curtailing the phenomenal rise in the general prices level
and the growth in labour unemployment rate. Externally, it is faced with the problem
of managing its potentially threatening external debt burden, achieving balance of
payments equilibrium and encouraging sizable inflow of foreign investible funds .
Since 1986, Nigeria embarked upon a series of stabilization strategies as an
integral part of a larger structural adjustment programme (SAP). Prior to the
commencement of the SAP, the traditional tools of macroeconomic management
were fiscal and monetary policies owing to the controlled regime in the foreign
exchange market The adoption of the SAP led to series of exchange rate measures
aimed at ensuring that the perceived over-valuation of the domestic currency is
conected. Since then the country could be described as having undergone regimes
of massive liberalization, partial liberalization and what is sometimes called
controlled-deregulation. Over time, scholars have argued that the whole exercise
*
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represents a 'wild goose chase' because all attempts at achieving the desired domestic
and external stabilization seems to have failed. Attention now seems to be focused
on the effectiveness of stabilization measures under exchange rate regimes embarked
upon over the years.
Understanding the design and implementation of stabilisation measures is
important for both economic and political reasons. Stabilisation measures have their
short to medium term costs which could be enormous to threaten the political process
and if such threats are perceived, then the stabilisation process could be reversed or
abandoned altogether. This is particularly important in countries experimenting with
democratic institutions which tend to lack the power to enforce drastic economic
changes. In such cases, the politicians would have to return to the electorates to
renew their mandate after a stipulated time interval. The short-run costs of
stabilisation and adjustment could jeopardise the chahces of the politicians in the
next election.
Also, given that stabilisation measures are second-best options, there is no
guarantee that the outcomes will be optimal and socially desirable. Economic theory
has its results which are largely based on the assumption of an efficient market
system. It becomes important to understand to what extent the structure of an economy
determines the effectiveness of stabilisation measures, and also the extent to which
alternative exchange rate regimes influence the outcomes of stabilisation measures.
In economics, the structure of an economy is traditionally described by the relevant
parameters of a stipulated model and this approach is followed in this paper.
The basic objective of this paper is to examine how, given the structure of the
Nigeria economy, alternative exchange rate regimes affect the ability of
macroeconomic policy-makers to influence economic activities through monetary
and fiscal policies. In other words, we examine the role of alternative exchange rate
regimes in determining the effectiveness of stabilisation policy in Nigeria through
an empirical postulated macro-model. This model is then used to examine the twindeficit syndrome. That is, we examine the extent of relationship between the
government's fiscal policy stance and the performance of the economy on current
account of the balance of payments.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section II briefly discusses some
theoretical and empirical literature on exchange rate and macro-economic
stabilisation. Section ill discusses the structure of the model, while section IV presents
the empirical results. Section V discusses our results vis-a-vis the theory and section
VI presents the conclusion.
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II.

SOME THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ISSUES ON EXCHANGE RATE

-

Open economy macroeconomics in the last three decades have been dominated
by the issue of how to achieve full employment without inflation (internal balance)
along with equilibrium in the balance of payments ( external balance). The
fundamental questions here include: When is it appropriate to vary the exchange
rate? What appropriate monetary-fiscal policy mix will be required for the
simultaneous achievement of external and internal balances?
To a large extent, modem approaches of analysis have followed the Mundell
(1963) and Fleming (1962) expositions, although earlier writers such as Lerner (1944)
and Robinson (1947) have adopted the elasticity approach. Harberger ( 1950) and
Alexander (1952) have also specifically examined the impact of devaluation on the
trade balance. In general, the thrust of the literature has been a systematic analysis
of the role played by international capital mobility in determining the effectiveness
of macro-economic policies under alternative exchange rate regimes, (See Barro
and Fischer, 1976; Marston, 1985; Blanchard 1988; and Fisher, 1988). Though the
emphasis have been different over time, the essence of the argument still remains
the analysis of open economy stabilisation policy.
The novelty of the Mundell (1963) and Fleming ( 1962) models lies in not
only systematically evaluating the role of international capital mobility in determining
the effectiveness of macro-economic policies under alternative exchange rate
regimes, but in extending the Keynesian income-expenditure framework developed
by Machlup (1943) and Metzler (1942), as well as the policy-oriented model
developed by Meade ( 1951 ), to include economies open to international trade in
both goods and financial assets. Over time, the model has taken different directions
and is still the core of traditional open-economy macroeconomics. Such directions
(taken over time) include the stock (p01tfolio) specifications of capital mobility by
Mckinnon ( 1969), Branson ( 1970), Floyd ( 1969), and Frenkel and Rodriquez (1975);
analyses of debt-revaluation effects to exchange rate changes by Boyer ( 1977) and
Rodriquez (1979); and long-run framework by Rodriquez ( 1979); and analysis of
expectations and exchange rate dynamics by Kouri ( 1976) and Dornbusch ( 1976).
Dervis (1985) provided critical evaluation of the model.
Using the model for the analysis of alternative exchange rate regimes and for
different degrees ofinternational capital mobility had been undertaken by Swoboda
and Dornbusch ( 1973) and Musa ( 1979). A survey of various open economy macroeconomic issues is also contained in Frenkel and Mussa ( 1985) and Kenen ( 1985).
A survey of application is contained in Mattson ( 1985), while Obstfeld and Stockman
( 1985) have provided a survey of exchange rate dynamics in this and related models.
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A comprehensive treatment ofMundell-Fleming model is given in Dornbusch (1980).
Blanchard (1988) addresses the monetary aspect, while Fischer ( 1988) ignores
open economy issues. Basically, the disappointment following the system of floating
exchange rate adopted in many western economies in the 1970s brought about a
renewed attention to the subject. As Purris (1985) argues, the result of this has been
that the large swings which have occurred in exchange rates have often become the
source of need for domestic policy adjustment rather than serving as an expedient
mechanism for facilitating adjustment of the economy to various disturbances. It is
this development that prompted renewed investigation of a number of issues in
open economy macroeconomics.
Frenkel and Razin (1987) provide an exposition ofthe Mundell-Fleming model
that integrates various aspects into a single framework. Such aspects include the
distinction between short-run and long-run consequences of policies, the implications
of debt and tax financing ofthe public budget and the role of exchange rate. Kearney
(1990) made a survey of both 'postulated' macro models and optimising macro
models used in analysing open economy stabilization policy. Generally, the results
of postulated macro-model have been that under a fixed exchange rate regime, fiscal
policy increases output and reduces trade balance, while under a flexible exchange
rate regime, fiscal policy has no effect on output, but it appreciates the exchange
rate and causes a decline in trade balance. On the other hand, under fixed exchange
rate, monetary policy has no effect on output, exchange rate and the trade balance,
while under a flexible exchange rate regime, monetary policy increases output,
depreciates the exchange rate and causes a decline in trade balance. These results
are conditional on the assumption made with respect to capital mobility.

Ill.

THEMODEL

A simple version of the Mundel-Fleming Model is adopted for this study. The
structure of the model is presented below.

Expenditures and Public Revenue
C = c(Y,W)
c' V . c'W > 0
I = I(Y,r) iy>0 , ir .< 0
G=G
T = t(Y) t/ 0

.................................................(1)

···············································(2)
··················································(3)
................................................... (4)

Balance of Payments
................................................... (5)
X = x (S.P/p*) x's > 0
M = m (S.P/p*, Y,R) M's>0,M' /0,M'R>0
................................ (6)
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CA
K
BP
AD

= (X-M) -rD
=
=

=

Money
MdL
Ms=
B =

Identities
Y
=
DD =
Ms =
W
=

................................................... (7)
R(S.P/p*),(r-1 *+Dse,W) K, 8 < 0,K,, <0, K,w,>0 ........................ (8)
CA+ K
......................................... (9)
rD - (X-M)- (K-LiR)
....................................... (10)

=

l(Y,r,W). PL,y <0, L,w, >0

.............................. (11)

H+ R

................................................. (12)
b(Y,W,Y,r*+BSe).Pb
,>0,br * <0,br>0,bw>0 .......................... (13)
·
y

C + 1 + G + X-M
··· ······· ···· ··· ·············· ········(14)
DR-BP
......_. .............................................. ... (15)
Md
................... .... .. ...................................... ... (16)
L+B+K
.................... ....... ....................................... (17)

G-T = L1H- + L1B - L1R
M-X = Af<.+AD-AR
Where:
C
I

............ .. ........................................... (18)
.......................................................... (19)

= Private Domestic Consumption

= Domestic Investment
= Gross Domestic Output
= Exports
X
= Imports
M
=Taxes
T
= Domestic real rate of interest
r
r* + ASe = Foreign interest rate adjusted for expected exchange
rate depreciation
S.P/p* = Real Spot exchange rate
S
= Domestic currency price of foreign exchange
Md = Money demand
= Bonds
B
H
= High powered money
CA = Current Accounts
K
= Capital Accounts
D
= Foreign debt in domestic currency term
R
= Reserve of foreign exchange
W
= Stock of Wealth
= Domestic Price level
P

y
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G

= Government expenditure

A 'bar' means the variable is determined by the relevant authority
'*' signifies a foreign variable.
For simplicity, we assume that Nigeria is small country and as such could not
influence foreign variables such as foreign rate of interest, r*. Futhermore, we set
all prices and wages to unity so that all variables are defined in real terms. This is
in line with the original Mundell - Fleming formulation. We also assume that
expectations are formed in a static manner so that S = 0. By imposing Walras law
we can make
domestic bonds to be the residual in private portfolio, and so it will drop out of the
analysis.
Equations ( 14) to ( 19) define the national income identity, debt accumulation
process, money market equilibrium, wealth identity, government budget constraint
and the external sector balance which allows for reserve variation and nonconsolidation of the capital accounts. By substituting (1) to (13) into equations (14)
to (19) and differentiating totally, we arrive at the following linear equations:
0

(c' y-cit' y +iy - m .y) dy + irdr + Cwdw + dG + (X' s - m')
ds - M ' RdR....... (20)
s
dD

(i + m 'R)dR-(X' s-m' s + R' s)ds + M' y sY + (D-k')
+ dr-k' w + rdD ...(21)
r

dH + dR = C' y dY + Crdr + C wdw
dW =

.......................................... (22)

LdY+(L
+Tr)dr + (C w + R' w)dw + Rds
y
r
s

............................. (23)

dR

=

dH + t y dY - dG

....................................... (24)

dk

=

Rsds + (K, - D)dr + Rwdw - rdD

...................................... (25)

Under a fixed exchange rate regime (ds = 0), equations (20)-(25) solve for six
variables, Y, r, W, R, D and K. While under a flexible exchange rate (dr =0), the
system solves for Y, r, W, S, D and K. The extent of foreign capital mobility is
captured by Rs , R,, and Rw. For this study, ~represented the marginal response of
non-oil exports to Naira adjustment 'Vis-a-vis the American dollars. For all the
behavioural equations in ( 1) to ( 19), a linear relationship is postulated and the
parameters estimated by least square. The levels of G and H represent exogenous or
policy variables. The systems of equations (20) - (25) determine the short-run
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. It should be noted that equation
( 18) allows for financing deficit through money creation or reserved variation. This
formulation means we cannot focus on the 'pure' effects of fiscal policy.
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expansion is bond (or debt) financed when dT = 0.
Equations (20) - (28) are linear in both variables and parameters and these are
solved by simple matrix inversion. It should be noted that some of parameters derived
from the least square estimation of the equations were insignificant and some had
wrong signs. However, we believe that such parameters capture the data adequately
based on goodness of fit tests conducted.

IV.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

First, under a fixed exchange rate regime, three different scenarios were
evaluated (See Table 1). The first being a zero per cent interest rate and zero level of
external debt, followed by a 1 per cent interest rate and a unit level of external debt,
then a 10 per cent level of interest rate with a unit level of external debt. A base run
solution where dG = dH = 0 naturally gives a trivial solution which acts as our
benchmark. A unit increase in public sector expenditure (dG= l) was observed to
increase real output by 3.56 units (See Table 1), interest rate rose by 0.0021 units,
while wealth balance and external reserve declined by 0.25 and 0.29 ui1its
respectively. Since public sector expenditure (when dT=0) will be financed by money
creation (dH>0) or and reserve variation, given the stock of bonds, if dH=0, then
reserve will fall to finance such deficit which will decrease money supply. The
capital accounts rose by 0.04 units mainly owing to the rise in interest rate, while
external debt rose by 0.72 unit because of the deficit in the current accounts.
When high-powered money was increased by 1 unit (dH= l), without any
change in public expenditure, real output declined by 8.57 unit (See Table 2), interest
rate fell by 0.0006 units, while wealth balance increased by 0.72 unit. External
reserve, external debt and the capital accounts decreased by 0.11 , 1.56 and 0.17
units respectively. The current account surplus and increase in reserve led to the fall
in external debt.
A simultaneous unit increase in public expenditure and money supply decreased
output, interest rate, external reserve, external debt and the capital account. However,
wealth effect was positive.
Allowing for interest rate of 1 percent and a unit level of external indebtedness,
we observed that fiscal expansion produced the same result with marginal increases
in external debt and the capital account. That is a positive level of interest rate and
external debt produced similar result, the difference being in the changes in external
debt and the capital account. The change in external debt was more than when
interest rate and debt were set at zero, while the reduction in the capital accow1t was
less. The level of initial interest rate was raised to 10 per cent and we observed that
the impact was also on the levels of external debt and the capital account.
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For a flexible exchange rate regime, we observed that fiscal expansion
increased real output by 5 units (when interest rate and existing level of debt are set
at zero). Real interest rate reduced and so were all other modelled variables. A unit
increase in high powered money reduced output by 5 units. All other variables
declined also. A simultaneous unit increase in public expenditure and money supply
left output unchanged. All other modelled variable, however, declined. A positive
level of interest rate (l percent) and unit level of external debt produced similar
results with marginal differences in the changes in external debt and capital account
balance. Increasing the level of existing interest rate to 10 per cent impacted on the
changes in external debt and capital account. However, in all cases the exchange
rate fell, that is the domestic currency appreciated in value. The larger impact on
exchange rate came from a simultaneous unit increase in public expenditure and
money supply.
From the above results, certain tentative findings emerged. First, we observed
that under a flexible exchange rate system, fiscal policy will increase real income,
while monetary policy will contract it, both with the same absolute value. A
simultaneous fiscal and monetary expansion leaves output unchanged. Second, under
a flexible exchange rate regime, fiscal and monetary policy tend to reduce real interest
rate with a larger effect owing to monetary policy. Third, the above findings tend to
be largely invariant to the level of existing interest rate and external debt. Also,
external debt varied more owing to fiscal than monetary expansion.
However, under a fixed exchange rate regime, fiscal policy is less expansionary
and monetary policy more contractionary than under a flexible exchange rate regime;
the net effect of a simultaneous fiscal and monetary expansion being a decline in
real output. Also, fiscal policy increases real interest rate, while monetary policy
reduces it with a net effect that results in reduced interest rate. Thus, in controlling
real interest rate, monetary policy tends to be more effective. Under a fixed exchange
rate system, wealth balance responds more to monetary expansion. Also, under a
fixed exchange rate system, monetary policy tends to be a more effective debt
management tool as fiscal expansion increases external debt, while monetary policy
reduces it, resulting in a negative net effect. When exchange rate is fixed, fiscal
policy tends to increase capital account balances, however, this conclusion is reversed
as real interest rate rises; the net effect being a decline in capital account balance.
Under a flexible exchange rate system, fiscal policy affects the exchange rate
more than monetary policy. Both tend to always reduce the exchange rate, i.e. both
could lead to domestic currency appreciation. In sum, under flexible and fixed
exchange rate regimes, output, interest rate, wealth balance, exchange rate and
external reserve tend to be largely invariant to the existing levels of real interest rate
and external debt, while the level of debt and capital account are sensitive to the
existing levels of real interest rate and external debt. Real output tends to be
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unchanged when fiscal and monetary policies are combined under a flexible exchange
rate, while it tends to decline under a fixed exchange rate system.
IV.I Theory and The Facts

From the analysis of the last section, we observed that in certain respects, our
empirical model confirms the theoretical expec.:Lations, while in others it contradicts it.
These are explained below.
We observed, in accordance with theory, that monetary policy is not neutral in
the short-run and , infact, impacted more on output than fiscal policy under a fixed
exchange rate regime. Its impact observed to be contractionary with respect to output;
this is contrary to theoretical expectation. It was also observed that exchange rate
may likely not be largely a monetary phenomenon. Fiscal expansion impacts more
on exchange rate than monetary policy. This result may have to be interpreted with
caution since the parameters of the model tend to reflect the Nigerian situation.
Finally, it was noted that interest rate responds more to monetary policy than
to fiscal policy.
JV.2 Fiscal Policy and The Current Account Balance.
On the issue of the twin deficit, under a flexible exchange rate system, both
fiscal and monetary policies resulted in surplus in the current account, with fiscal
policy having the larger impact. However, under a fixed exchange rate regime, fiscal
expansion, by increasing public expenditure (through debt), resulted in ctment deficit,
while monetary policy caused a surplus, with a positive net effect. It was, thus,
observed that the ability of fiscal measures to lead to a current account deficit will
depend, to a large extent, on the type of exchange rate regime. However, monetary
policy was observed not to result in current account deficit under both exchange
rate regimes.
V.

TENTATIVE POLICY ISSUES

From the discussion above, some policy issues and recommendation are
highlighted below. First, it is obvious that for any economy, both fiscal and monetary
policies are required, but their effects differ under different exchange rate regimes.
Our results tend to favour the use of a flexible exchange rate regime in
macroeconomic management in Nigeria. The reasons are highlighted as follows.
First, monetary and fiscal policies do tend to lead to current account deficit; second,
fiscal policy expanded output more, while monetary policy contracted output less,
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when compared to a regime of fixed exchimge rate. The effect of policy (especially
fiscal policy) on external debt is more under a flexible exchange rate regime.
That Nigeria is a severely-indebted low-income country is no news. Debt
management is a topical macroeconomic issue. The management of external debt
tends to be more effective under a flexible exchange rate. Also, expansionary fiscal
and monetary policies do not seem to have the tendency to raise real interest rate as
fiscal policy does under a fixed exchange rate regime.
Also, under the suggested flexible exchange rate regime, we favour the use of
fiscal policy more in the control of macroeconomic aggregates. This does not suggest
that we do not favour the use of monetary policy, but rather, monetary policy under
a flexible exchange rate system will strengthen fiscal measures in certain respects,
especially in the control of interest rate, current account and debt reduction. There
is, however, the tendency for it to reduce output. But such reduction is less (in absolute
term) than the reduction arising from monetary expansion under a fixed exchange
rate regime.

VI

CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of any stabilisation policy will depend largely on the structure
of the economy or the country in question. The structure of an economy is typically
captured by the relevant parameters ofa stipulated model. The observations presented
above are constrained by certain limitations. For instance, the inter-temporal
restrictions on public sector budget is not taken into consideration. This is usually
taken care of by forward looking inter-temporal optimisation models. Also our
assumption about expectation and foreign variable could limit the general validity
of the results. However, it should be observed that a depressed economy is unlikely
to have a structure similar to those obtained in advanced industrialised economies.
In that case, the effectiveness of any policy rule will have to take into consideration
the structure and features of such an economy. Such features may make the results
derivable from theory unrealistic. Thus, it is clear that stabilisation policies have
different effects under alternative exchange rate regimes. The ability of fiscal
expansion to lead to current account deficit will also depend on the exchange rate
regime. The adoption of any stabilisation measures by depressed developing countries
may need to be examined against the structure and features ofthat particular economy,
and given the features of that economy, it must design an appropriate exchange rate
system if desired results are to be achieved.
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TABLE 1.

SHORT-RUN MULITIPLIER OF A UNIT RISE IN GOVERNMENT
SPENDING UNDER FIXED AND FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES.

MULITPLIERS
AFFECTED VARIABLES

Real Output
Real Interest
Real Wealth
External Reserves
External Debt
Capital Accounts
Current Accounts

DEBT FINANCED RISE
FIXED EXCHANGE RATE
r = 1%: D = 1 r= 10%: D = 1
r=0%: D =O
3.56
3.56
3.56
0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
-0.25
-0.25
-0.25
-0.29
-0.29
-0.29
0.80
0.72
0.72
0.03
0.03
0.04
-0.14
-1.05
-1.04
FIEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE

Real Output
Real Interest
Real Wealth
External Reserves
External Debt
Capital Accounts
Current Accounts

TABLE 2.

5
-0.0001
-1.37
-0.0004
-4.22
-1.37
5.59

5
-0.0001
-1.37
-0.0004
4.26
-1.33
5.58

5
-0.0001
-1.37
-0.0009
-4.69
-0.90
5.49

SHORT-RUN MULITIPLIER OF A UNIT RISE IN MONEY SUPPLY
UNDER FIXED AND FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES.
MULITPLIERS
AFFECTED VARIABLES

Real Output
Real Interest
Real Wealth
External Reserves
External Debt
Capital Accounts
Current Accounts

DEBT FINANCED RISE
FIXED EJi CHANGE RATE
r = 0%: 0=0
r= 1%:B = 1 r = 10%: D = 1
-5.57
-5.57
-5.57
-0.0006
-0.0006
-0.0006
0.72
0.72
0.72
-0.11
-0.11
-0.11
-1.74
-1.58
-1.56
0.0064
-0.15
-0.17
1.52
-1.62
1.61
FIEXIBLI EXCHANGE RATE

Real Output
Real Interest
Real Wealth
External Reserves
External Debt
Capital Accounts
Current Accounts

-5
-0.0008
0.28
-0.0002
-0.79
-0.72
1.50

-5
-0.0008
0.28
-0.0002
-0.79
-0.71
1.49

-5
-0.0008
0.28
-0.0002
-0.87
-0.63
1.4
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